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ABSTRACT 
 
BACKGROUND:   Previous functional imaging studies investigating the neural correlates of 
financial decision-making have suggested that subjects may adopt different response 
strategies depending on the degree of reward/punishment they received.  We wanted to 
investigate whether there is a strategic difference, and whether a shift in response strategy 
relates to differential BOLD fMRI activation. 
 
METHOD:  A within-subject, block design using a modified continuous performance task 
divided into a reward and punishment session was used to examine fMRI BOLD responses in 
18 healthy volunteers.  Six black and white line drawings were simultaneously presented to 
the participants for 300 ms. They were to determine if one of the six drawings depicted an 
animal or insect.  The background colour of the screen indicated whether they could win 
NOK 3 and lose NOK 1 for correct and incorrect responses, or whether there were no 
monetary consequences.  In the punishment session, the amounts that could be won or lost 
were reversed.  Strategic flexibility was measured as a difference in response bias (lnβ) 
between monetary contingencies. 
 
RESULTS:  Both the reward and the punishment block yielded significant activations in the 
bilateral: ventral striatum, anterior insula, anterior cingulate and the orbitofrontal cortex 
compared to blocks without monetary consequences.  Participants adopted a more liberal 
response bias in the punishment block than in the no-punishment block.  Those who showed 
greater response-strategy flexibility in the punishment session had increased dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex, sensory motor area and ventral lateral orbitofrontal cortex activation 
compared to those who were less strategically flexible.  There was no difference in activations 
between the reward and punishment blocks. 
 
CONCLUSIONS:  These findings suggest that there are differences in response strategies in 
studies using financial decision-making models and that these differences manifest as 
differential activation patterns that may need to be modelled or controlled for in future 
studies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
NEUROECONOMICS 
Everyday, people make hundreds of different decisions.  These range from the mundane 
decision of what to cook for dinner, to the more profound decision of what career path to 
choose.  No matter the gravity of the decision to be made, the chosen outcome guides 
subsequent behaviour.  Animal research has demonstrated that stimuli that are either 
rewarding or predict reward will elicit approach behaviour (Berridge & Robinson, 1998).  
Conversely, stimuli that are punishing or predict punishment will result in avoidance 
behaviour (Berridge, 2007).  Humans behave the same way - they approach reward and avoid 
punishment.  They also have the mental flexibility to adopt different strategies in the decisions 
they make.  This is evident when two people confronted with an identical choice scenario 
make different decisions, or when a single person with the same choice scenario, but in a 
different context, makes two different decisions. 
While people exercise a degree of flexibility in the decision-making strategies they use, the 
choices people make are still predictable enough that they can be modelled mathematically.  
Expected Utility Theory (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944) suggests that the expected 
utility of a decision (U) is the sum of its probability weighted (p) outcomes [u(x)]: 
U(p1,x1;…; pn,xn) = p1u(x1)+…+pnu(xn) 
According to this theory, people will choose the decision which maximises utility.  Consider, 
for example, the decision between A) a 50% chance of winning 500Kr and a 50% chance of 
winning nothing; and B) a 100% chance of winning 240Kr: 
A(p1,x1; p2,x2) = 0.5(500Kr) + 0.5(0) = 250Kr 
B(p1,x1; p2,x2) = 240Kr 
Since the expected utility of A is 250Kr and the expected utility of B is 240Kr, Expected 
Utility Theory predicts that A will be chosen over B; however, it is not.  Prospect Theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) terms this ―the certainty effect,‖ whereby outcomes obtained 
with certainty are more heavily weighted than those which are uncertain.  To account for this 
and other incongruencies in Utility Theory, Prospect Theory suggests that there is a decision 
weight (π) associated with the probability value which affects the over-all value of a decision: 
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V(x, p; y, q) = π(p)v(x) + π(q)v(y) 
While these two theories do differ, they share the conception that expected reward value is a 
combination of the magnitude of the reward and the expected risk involved in obtaining it. 
Expected reward value = reward magnitude x expected risk 
Since the decisions that people make play such a large role in their subsequent behaviour, a 
large body of research has focused on investigating how the decision-making process is 
represented in the human brain.  The advent of functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) and the idea that different components of the decision-making process – risk, 
magnitude, and value – are represented in different areas of the human brain has led to the 
creation of a relatively new scientific field known as neuroeconomics.  This field investigates 
the neural mechanisms that underlie financial decision-making. 
 
VENTRAL STRIATUM 
Many of the early neuroeconomic studies focused on the role the human ventral striatum 
plays in decision-making.  The interest in this area of the brain was a direct result of the large 
body of animal research implicating the mesolimbic dopaminergic pathway in reward 
processes (Schultz, 1997; Schultz, 1998).  Animal studies demonstrated that blocking striatal 
dopamine (DA) diminished behavioural response for reward, while increasing striatal DA 
enhanced reward response behaviour (Ikemoto & Panksepp, 1999).  Disruption and 
enhancement of ventral striatal DA seemed to directly affect an item’s worth.  This suggested 
that a reward’s value was represented in the ventral striatum.  Similarly, human positron 
emission tomography (PET) studies found that there was a link between ventral striatal DA 
release and the receipt of monetary reward (Thut et al., 1997; Zald et al., 2004).  Functional 
MRI studies showed that the ventral striatum was involved in processing primary reward 
(Berns et al., 2001), the rewarding properties of drugs of abuse (Breiter et al., 1997), and 
monetary reward (Delgado et al., 2000; Knutson et al., 2000; Knutson et al., 2001a; Knutson 
et al., 2001b; Breiter et al., 2001; Ernst et al., 2004; Jensen et al., 2007).  It was further 
demonstrated that monetary reward related activation was proportional to the value of the 
reward that could be gained (Elliott et al., 2000; Knutson et al., 2001a; Knutson et al., 2003).  
Ventral striatal activation to reward magnitude also appeared to be independent of reward 
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probability (Knutson et al., 2005) suggesting that the ventral striatum encodes reward 
magnitude, but not risk. 
There are several problems with the idea that the ventral striatum represents reward 
magnitude.  First, studies have shown that the ventral striatum responds to salient non-
rewarding events in both animals (Horvitz, 2000) and humans (Zink et al., 2003; Zink et al., 
2004).  Second, fMRI studies have shown that aversive as well as appetitive stimuli activate 
the ventral striatum (Jensen et al., 2003; Levita et al., 2008).  Two theories have tried to 
account for these findings.  One suggests that the ventral striatum codes for both the valence 
and salience of stimuli (Cooper & Knutson, 2008).  The other proposes that the ventral 
striatum encodes an error-prediction signal between the expected value of a reward and the 
value of the reward that is actually received (McClure et al., 2003; Pessiglione et al., 2006; 
Jensen et al., 2007; Menon et al., 2007; Seymour et al., 2007; Hare at al., 2008).   
A prediction-error arises when the outcome of a decision results in a different value than what 
was expected.  For example, if one predicts that a particular decision will lead to a 500Kr 
reward, but what is received is 400Kr or 600Kr reward instead, a negative or a positive 
prediction-error has respectively occurred.  In keeping with animal studies that have found 
that midbrain dopamine modulates a prediction-error signal (Schultz, 1997; Schultz, 2002), 
functional MRI studies have demonstrated that the ventral striatum responded to prediction-
error regardless of whether the stimulus was aversive or appetitive (Jenson et al., 2007).  It 
has also been shown that there is a functional division of the ventral striatum with an anterior 
portion coding financial gain prediction-errors, and a more posterior portion coding financial 
loss prediction-errors (Seymour et al., 2007).  A prediction-error signal is important in the 
decision-making process because it signals that one’s calculation of expected reward value 
from reward magnitude and expected risk is incorrect.  This should lead to an updating of 
magnitude and risk valuation and will possibly alter decision-making strategy and behaviour. 
It has been found that ventral striatal activation increases with both increasing reward 
magnitude and increasing reward probability (Abler et al., 2006; Yacubian et al., 2006).  This 
finding implicates the ventral striatum as the region that integrates the reward magnitude and 
risk components of a decision option, and represents their combined contribution as reward 
value (Knutson & Bossaerts, 2007).   This finding, along with the prediction-error literature, 
suggests that the ventral striatum is involved in coding the value of a decision-outcome as 
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well as the prediction-error that results if there is a disparity between the expected and 
obtained value of that decision. 
ORBITOFRONTAL CORTEX 
One of the problems using fMRI to separate the brain regions that code for expected 
magnitude, expected risk, expected value and prediction-errors is that activations in these 
regions are highly correlated (Hare et al., 2008).  Using a study that separated reward 
magnitude and prediction-error, Hare et al. (2008) replicated the finding that prediction error 
is coded in the ventral striatum, and in addition found that reward magnitude was represented 
in the medial orbitofrontal cortex (OFC).  Interestingly,  lateral OFC activation positively 
correlates with punishment magnitude while medial OFC activation positively correlates with 
reward magnitude and that there is a reciprocal relationship between the two areas – when 
lateral OFC activation increases, medial OFC activation decreases (O’Doherty, et al., 2001), 
suggesting that the magnitude of both rewards and punishments are represented in the OFC.   
These finding complement the animal literature which suggests that the value of primary 
rewards was  represented in the OFC (Rolls, 2000), and that OFC activity increased as the 
relative value of a reward increased (Padoa-Schioppa & Assad, 2006).  
In keeping with findings from the animal literature, functional MRI studies have found that 
the OFC coded relative and not absolute value of reward magnitude (Watanabe, 1999; Elliott 
et al., 2003; Knutson et al., 2003; Elliott et al., 2008).  It has also been reported that patients 
with OFC damage were inconsistent in how they coded relative value (Fellows & Farah, 
2007).  In a value-based preference study, participants were presented with pairs of items, for 
example: an apple (A), a brown coloured square (B), a carrot (C), and indicated which item in 
a pair they preferred over the other.  If A was preferred to B and B was preferred to C, then 
they should prefer A over C.  A preference of C over A is inconsistent.  Patients with OFC 
damage had significantly more inconsistent preferences than controls.  This finding was 
interpreted as impairment in the ability to represent relative value, further supporting a role 
for the OFC in representing relative reward value (Fellows & Farah, 2005).   
Since representing relative reward magnitude is essential for decision-making, it is no large 
surprise that patients with OFC damage have pervasive decision-making impairments 
(Elsinger & Damasio, 1985; cf. Wallis, 2007).  It appears that these decision-making deficits 
are not just related to impaired reward-magnitude representation, but also to inflexibility in 
response strategy.  Shifting strategy is a type of exploratory behaviour.  For example, if 
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someone always chooses the same option, they learn nothing about the outcome of other 
options.  To explore their environment, people still occasionally choose alternative options to 
see what happens, specifically to see if another option is more highly rewarded than the 
current option.  This strategic flexibility has been suggested to be missing in patients with 
OFC damage (Maia & McClelland, 2004).  For example, it has been found that patients with 
OFC damage fail in a reversal learning paradigm (Rolls, 1994 cf. Rolls, 2004).  In this type of 
paradigm there were two choices, A and B, one of which resulted in reward.  Throughout the 
experiment the reward contingencies were reversed; for example, if selection of choice A 
resulted in reward, the contingencies would switch so that it was now choice B that resulted in 
reward.  While healthy controls quickly reversed strategies, choosing B over A, it took OFC 
damaged patients  significantly more trials to learn the contingency reversal suggesting that 
they were not as strategically flexible as the healthy controls (Maia & McClelland, 2004). 
A paradox in decision-making theory is that while people still calculate expected reward value 
as the product of reward magnitude and expected risk, they do not always make the choice 
that maximises reward value.  For example, in a social decision-making game, if a person 
believes an offer from their partner on how to divide a sum of money between them is unfair, 
they will refuse the offer resulting in neither partner receiving money.  In this instance a 
person refuses to maximise reward value (no matter how small) so they may punish their 
partner (Sanfey et al., 2003).  The orbitofrontal cortex has been implicated in a similar 
paradox where minimising regret is chosen over maximising reward (Camille et al., 2004; 
Coricelli et al., 2007).  Healthy and OFC damaged participants were given a choice between 
different types of gambles; for example, a 20% chance of winning 200Kr, and an 80% chance 
of losing 50Kr, or a 50% chance of either winning or losing 50Kr.  After the trial was 
completed, participants were shown what would have happened had they chosen one of the 
other gambles.  This allowed them to engage in counterfactual thinking – ―if only I had 
chosen a instead of b, I would have won x instead of losing y.‖  Ironically, it was found that 
while patients with OFC damage behaved according to the mathematical models of decision-
making, insofar as they continued to choose gambles which maximised reward value, healthy 
controls deviated from the models and chose gambles that would minimise regret (Camille et 
al., 2004).  It appears, then, that the OFC, in addition to playing a role in representing relative 
reward magnitude, may play a role in response-strategy selection. 
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ANTERIOR INSULAR CORTEX 
It has been found that people adjust their decision-making strategy as the risk associated with 
different decisions changes.  This suggests that there is a region of the brain that is able to 
track risk (Preuschoff et al., 2008; Craig, 2009).  The anterior insular cortex (AIC), a region of 
the brain often activated in decision-making paradigms (Knutson et al., 2000; Sanfey et al., 
2003; Knutson et al., 2008; Preuschoff et al., 2008; Clark et al., 2009) is hypothesised to be 
such a region.  It has bidirectional connections with other areas implicated in decision-making 
like the ventral striatum, OFC, and anterior cingulate cortex (Reynolds & Zahm, 2005) and is 
activated by ambiguity and uncertainty (Preuschoff et al., 2008).  This makes it a good 
candidate for coding changing risk.  It has been suggested that the AIC codes for risk 
prediction-error in the same manner that the ventral striatum is hypothesised to code for 
reward prediction-error.  According to both Expected Utility Theory (von Neumann & 
Morgenstern, 1944) and Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), people must 
determine the risk associated with a decision because risk and magnitude are used to calculate 
expected reward value and it is the option that maximise reward value that should be chosen.  
If the actual risk is different than the expected risk, a risk prediction-error has occurred.  It has 
been found that bilateral insula activation positively correlates with both expected risk and 
risk prediction-errors and that these two signals are spatially and temporally separated 
(Preuschoff et al., 2008).  The expected risk signal was found to be located in the dorsal AIC 
while the risk prediction-error signal is more ventral.  Similarly, expected risk elicits AIC 
activation after a choice has been made and stays active until the choice outcome has been 
revealed.  Conversely, the risk prediction-error signal occurs in a fast on/off manner 
immediately after choice outcome is known. 
While the risk-prediction-error hypothesis satisfies the mathematical component of Prospect 
Theory and Expected Utility theory, there is an emotional element to decision-making that the 
theories can not  account for and that the AIC may play a part in modulating.  It has been 
suggested that AIC activation may mediate the negative emotion associated with risky 
decisions and modulate response strategy based on these emotions.  To this end, it has been 
found that insula activation is significantly stronger when choosing the riskier of two options 
(Paulus et al., 2003b).  Similarly, in an ultimatum game where one of two partners determines 
how a sum of money should be split between the two partners, bilateral AIC activation 
positively correlates with unfairness of the offer (Sanfey et al., 2003).  AIC activation also 
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positively correlates future rejection of an offer (Sanfey et al., 2003; Knutson et al., 2007), 
suggesting that it plays a role in response strategy determination as well as tracking risk. 
 
ANTERIOR CINGULATE CORTEX 
In the ultimatum game, activity in the bilateral anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), like the 
anterior insula, positively correlated with unfair trials (Sanfey et al., 2003).  The ACC is a 
region implicated in many different aspects of cognition; it is implicated in attention for target 
selection, motor response selection, performance monitoring, novelty detection and reward 
assessment (Bush et al., 2002).  The bidirectional connectivity between the ACC, the OFC, 
anterior insula and ventral striatum (Reynolds & Zahm, 2005) links it to the decision-making 
network, and many decision-making studies have found that the AIC and ACC are activated 
together (Craig, 2009).  The AIC and ACC are so closely linked, that human imaging studies 
have found that the ACC, like the AIC, seemed to code risk-prediction error (Brown and 
Braver, 2005). 
Both fMRI and event-related potential studies point to the ACC as involved in some form of 
error/performance monitoring (Debener et al., 2005; van Veen & Carter, 2006; Taylor et al., 
2007).  In this body of research, the ACC is implicated in detecting errors that have been 
committed and interacting with areas of the brain that exert executive control to refocus 
cognitive resources.  This may result in refocusing attentional resources or by affecting a 
change in strategy.  Recent studies have challenged the error/performance monitoring role of 
ACC demonstrating that it is not activated when errors are predicted or detected, but rather is 
active when there needs to be a change in behavioural strategy (Bush et al., 2002; Magno et 
al., 2008).  In a human imaging study, dorsal ACC activation has been shown to correlate 
with the need to switch strategy, whether the strategy shift was signalled by a cue or by 
reduced performance outcome on a task (Bush et al., 2002).    More specifically, the dorsal 
ACC has been shown to be active when a sub-optimal decision-making strategy is employed, 
whether that strategy is too risky or too conservative (Hewig et al., 2009).   
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PREDICTING FUTURE DECISIONS FROM BRAIN ACTIVATIONS 
While the majority of fMRI decision-making studies look at brain activation as the end 
product of a behavioural response, there are several studies that go in the other direction and 
infer future behaviour from brain activation patterns.  It has been found that when deciding 
whether or not to purchase a product, the stronger the activation in the ventral striatum, the 
more likely an individual is to subsequently buy the product.  Conversely, increased insula 
and decreased medial prefrontal cortex activity correlated with the subsequent decision to not 
buy the product (Knutson et al., 2007).  Similarly, in a social, decision-making game, 
increased right anterior insula cortex activity and decreased dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
activity correlated with a subsequent rejection of an offer, while the opposite activation 
pattern resulted in its acceptance (Sanfey et al., 2003).  It has also been found that there are 
neural correlates for individual differences in response strategy.  Individuals who showed 
greater relative activation to monetary losses and gains across the decision-making network 
were found to be more loss averse and chose more conservative strategies.  Those who had 
relatively weaker activations to gains and losses were less loss averse and chose riskier 
strategies (Tom et al., 2007).  It has also been found that individuals who choose risky 
decision-making strategies have relatively stronger dorsal ACC activation when they use too 
cautious a strategy, while cautious deciders show more dorsal ACC activity when they use a 
decision strategy that is too risky (Hewig et al., 2009). 
 
PRESENT STUDY 
Several studies have suggested that participants use different response strategies when making 
decisions under risk depending on whether their decisions are rewarded and punished, and to 
what extent (Elliott et al., 2003; Pessiglione et al., 2006; Cooper & Knutson, 2008).  Others 
have shown that individual differences in response strategy correlate with different neural 
sensitivities in the ventral striatum, insula and anterior cingulate cortex (Tom et al., 2007; 
Hewig et al., 2009).  These studies, however, were not primarily investigating differences in 
response strategy and their findings to that effect were coincidental.  Since strategic 
differences within and between experiments using different financial contingencies may 
confound decision-making findings, the present study seeks to investigate whether strategic 
differences do indeed exist, and what impact they may have on BOLD fMRI activation. 
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In the present study, we will use signal detection theory to investigate how both a monetary 
reward and a monetary punishment response contingency affect decision-making strategy on a 
continuous performance task and whether differences can be localised to the ventral striatum, 
anterior cingulate cortex, orbitofrontal cortex, and anterior insular cortex - four regions of 
interest implicated in reward and decision-making as described above. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 
Reward and Punishment Contingencies vs. No Reward Contingencies 
Since it is theorised that the ventral striatum, orbitofrontal cortex and anterior insular cortex 
respectively represent expected reward value, reward magnitude and expected risk, these 
brain regions will show more activation when responding under both the reward and the 
punishment contingencies than when responding without monetary reward or penalty.  Since 
the anterior cingulate is implicated in strategy shifting and in performance monitoring, there 
will be stronger activation in this region when there is a monetary contingency and failure to 
properly monitor performance and switch strategy results in financial loss.  Monetary 
contingency will not affect the ability to detect a target from amongst distracters.  However, 
since it has been found that post-error slowing occurs after infrequent errors and post-correct 
slowing occurs after infrequent correct trials (Notebaert et al., 2009), response time will be 
slower for the reward and punishment contingencies where task performance is emphasised 
by financial gain and loss than for the no monetary contingency where no performance 
feedback is given.  In line with findings from Cooper and Knutson (2008), response bias will 
be more liberal when there are monetary consequences than when there are no monetary 
consequences. 
 
Reward vs. Punishment 
It has been found that people are loss averse and will only accept a gamble if the amount that 
can be won is twice as large as the amount that can be lost (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  It 
has been proposed that this phenomenon can be explained by neuroimaging data that found 
that in several decision-making areas, including the ventral striatum, anterior cingulate cortex, 
and orbitofrontal cortex, losses are associated with stronger activations than gains (Tom et al., 
2007).  With this finding in mind we hypothesise that activation in the four regions of interest 
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will be greater, response time will be slower, and response strategy will be more conservative 
for punishment than for reward. 
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METHODS 
 
ETHICS 
This study was approved by the regional committee for medicine and health research South-
East A (REK Sør-Øst A).  Protocol number S-08549a. 
 
PARTICIPANTS 
Eighteen participants (mean age ± SD = 24.8 ± 1.9years; 7 females) were recruited for the 
study in accordance with regional ethics committee guidelines and provided written informed 
consent. All subjects were free of neurological, psychiatric and substance abuse problems.  
They did not have a history of problem gambling, medical problems, nor were they 
undergoing any medical treatment that could affect cerebral blood metabolism and blood 
flow.  Subjects were paid 300 Kr for their participation (150Kr for the screening interview 
and 150Kr for participating in the experimental paradigm) and kept any additional money 
they won in the task described below. 
 
DESIGN & DATA ACQUISITION 
Experimental Paradigm 
The paradigm was created and run in E-Prime software (version 1.2; Psychology Software 
Tools, Inc.; Pittsburgh, PA, USA).  Stimuli were presented to the participants in the scanner 
using NNL’s VisualSystem (NordicNeuroLab, Bergen, Norway) and responses were collected 
using NNL’s ResponseGrips (NordicNeuroLab, Bergen, Norway). 
 
Monetary contingency (Reward, Punishment and No contingency) was manipulated with a 
within-subject block design using a modified continuous performance task divided into two 
8.5 minute sessions.  The first session (Reward) consisted of three continuous performance 
tasks (CPTs) organised into blocks.  The three tasks were a baseline arrow task (BASE), a 
modified CPT signal-detection task where 3Kr was won for correct responses while 1Kr was 
lost for incorrect responses (REW), and the same modified CPT without a reward contingency 
(NC-REW) (Table 1).  The sequence of blocks was fixed with the baseline arrow block 
always preceding each of the continuous performance blocks (Fig. 1).  Both of the CPT 
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blocks were 28s long and were each repeated six times per session.  The baseline arrow block 
was repeated twelve times per session, and was only 14s in duration so participants spent the 
same total amount of time on each block type. 
 
The second session (Punishment) was identical to the first except the reward contingencies 
were reversed in the block with a monetary contingency (PUN) – 1Kr was won for correct 
responses and 3Kr was lost for incorrect responses.  The no contingency CPT block in this 
session is referred to as ―NC-PUN‖.  In both sessions, non-responses in the CPT blocks were 
penalised 3KR.  Response handedness, task background colour, and session order were 
counter-balanced over subjects. 
 
 
Table 1.  Abbreviations used for the different block types across sessions. 
 Baseline Monetary 
Contingency 
No Monetary 
Contingency 
Reward Session BASE REW NC-REW 
Punishment Session BASE PUN NC-PUN 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.  The sequence of blocks within the reward session.  This sequence is repeated six times resulting in 
twelve presentations of the Baseline block and six presentations each of the Rewarded and Unrewarded CPT 
blocks.  The sequence is the same in the punishment session. 
 
 
Individual trials on each of the three CPT blocks were composed of an identical series of 
events.  A stimulus was presented for 300ms followed by a response screen for 1300ms.  
Participants could respond during either of these two screens.  Once a response was made a 
feedback screen was presented for 750ms after which the next stimulus appeared (Figs. 2, 3 & 
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4).  What differed between the three tasks were the stimulus presented, and the feedback 
given. 
 
In the BASE block, six left or six right facing arrows were presented (Fig. 2).  Participants 
were instructed to press the corresponding button i.e. press the left button for the left-facing 
arrows.  If the participant’s response was correct, they would see the word “Correct” in black 
letters during the feedback screen.  If their response was incorrect, the word ―Incorrect‖ in red 
letters was presented. 
 
Fig. 2.  Baseline block.  Participants must indicate the direction the arrows are facing with a corresponding left 
or right button press.  They can respond during either the stimulus or the response screen.  Feedback is given; 
however, there are no monetary consequences. 
 
 
 
The stimuli for the CPT blocks were black and white line drawings of various objects 
(Snodgrass & Vanderwart, 1980).  The participants’ task was to determine whether one of the 
six pictures displayed depicted an animal or an insect – the target stimulus.  They responded 
with a button-press when the target was present and with a button-press using the other hand 
when the target was absent.  Different background colours were used to indicate whether there 
was a reward contingency in the ongoing block.  When the background of the screens was 
black, the win and loss of money was contingent on performance (Fig. 3).  During the 
feedback screen, participants saw their total winnings fluctuate up and down as they 
responded correctly and incorrectly.  When the screens’ background was green, the task was 
the same, however, there was no reward contingency (Fig. 4).  Regardless of the veracity of 
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the answer, the amount won stayed constant.  This was indicated during the feedback screen 
where the same amount (what had been won so far) was always displayed after each trial. 
 
 
Fig. 3.  Reward & Punishment blocks.   The stimulus is presented for 300ms followed by a question mark for 
1300ms.  Participants may respond during either of these two screens at which point the feedback screen 
depicting the total amount of money won is immediately presented.  The next trial begins after the feedback 
screen. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.  The No Contingency block is identical to both the Reward and Punishment blocks except there are no 
monetary consequences, no feedback given and the background colour is different.  The money won so far was 
displayed during the feedback screen and remained unchanged through the duration of this block. 
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Procedure 
Participants were recruited using a poster approved by the regional ethics committee 
(Appendix A).  The poster indicated that we were conducting an fMRI study and that 
participants would be paid for their time.  An e-mail address was provided for those who were 
interested in receiving further information.  Those who replied received an e-mail indicating 
that their participation would be needed over two days – one day to complete an hour long, in-
person interview, and the other day for scanning.  Those who still expressed an interest were 
contacted by telephone and asked general questions about their somatic and mental health as 
well as their suitability for participation in an fMRI study.  The experience of lying in a 
scanner, viewing a screen through goggles and responding using response grips was described 
to the participants.  Those who were not excluded and were still interested in participating 
were booked for an in-person interview. 
 At the outset of the in-person interview, the experimental paradigm (a more basic description 
of the paradigm below) was described to the participant and informed consent was given.  The 
MINI International Neuropsychiatric interview (Norwegian version 5.0.0) based on DSM-IV 
(Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders) criteria was used to assess mental 
health.  Participants were also screened to ensure there was nothing that could preclude them 
from participation (e.g. they were pregnant or had claustrophobia).   
A Norwegian version of the DSM-IV Pathological Gambling Diagnostic Form was used to 
assess problem gambling.   
As part of the screening interview participants completed a short, practice version of the 
paradigm to ensure that they were capable of performing the task.  By completing a practice 
version, a confounding learning effect would be reduced if not eliminated (Knutson et al., 
2001a).  In the practice version, pictures depicting modes of transportation were used as target 
stimuli.  These pictures were removed from the experimental task to avoid potential 
confusion. 
On the scanning day, participants entered the scanner and were oriented to the goggles and 
response grips.  The initial localiser scan was followed by the structural acquisition which was 
followed by the experimental paradigm described below. 
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fMRI Data Acquisition 
Imaging was conducted at Oslo University Hospital - Ullevål using a General Electric Signa 
HDx 3T scanner with a standard eight channel head coil (General Electric Company; 
Milwaukee, WI, USA).  Cushions were placed around the participants’ heads to prevent 
motion and earplugs were used to minimise noise.   
An axial localizer scan was used to orient all subsequent scans and a high-resolution, 
anatomical image was acquired using a T1-weighted GE FSPGR Bravo sequence (TR = 10.9s; 
TE = 4.6s; FA = 13°: 248 axial slices; 1.2mm thick; 240 mm x 240mm in-plane resolution, 
352x224 matrix) prior to functional imaging.  Functional images were acquired with a T2*-
weighted, echo-planar imaging sequence sensitive to the BOLD contrast (TR = 2s; TE = 
25ms; FA = 90°).  263 volumes were acquired in each session, the first eight of which were 
dummy volumes used to ensure that there was homologous tissue magnetisation.  Each 
volume consisted of 36 slices acquired parallel to the AC-PC plane (sequential acquisition; 
3.5mm thick with a 0.5mm gap; 260mm x 260mm in-plane resolution, 64 x 64 matrix). 
 
Data Quality 
The images were visually inspected for artefacts, abnormal variance and for signal dropout 
due to magnetic susceptibility in the region of the ventral striatum and the orbital frontal 
cortex.  One participant was excluded from analysis because she revealed post-scanning that 
she didn’t realise she would receive actual money. 
 
DATA ANALYSIS 
Behavioural Analysis 
Behavioural analyses were performed with SPSS 16.0 for Windows (Microsoft Corporation; 
Redmond, WA, USA).  Significant differences were identified at p < 0.05 using paired-
sample t-tests, testing for the main effect of reward contingency on response time, response 
bias (lnβ), and signal detection (d' ). 
Signal detection theory (SDT) measures how well participants are able to detect signal from 
noise and how liberally or conservatively they say a signal is present.  SDT makes the 
assumption that there are two overlapping Gaussian distributions (Green and Swets, 1966 & 
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MacMillan and Creelamn, 2001).  One distribution is noise alone, and the other is signal + 
noise (Figure 5).  The larger the distance between the peaks, the easier it is to discriminate 
signal from noise.  Discriminability can be determined using SDT by measuring the distance 
between the peaks of the distributions - a measure known as d'.   How liberally or 
conservatively a participant says, ―yes a signal is present‖ is known as the criterion value or 
response bias.  SDT is used to calculate this value giving an indication of the strategy 
employed by the participant in determining signal from noise. 
 
Fig. 5. Noise and signal + noise distributions. 
 
On each trial in a standard yes-no paradigm a signal is either present or absent.  Four 
types of responses can result: a hit, the participant correctly identifies that a signal is present; 
a miss, the participant incorrectly indicates that a signal is absent when in fact, it is present; a 
correct negative, the participant correctly identifies that there is no signal; and a false positive, 
the participant indicates that a signal is present when it is not (Table 2). 
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Table 2. The four possible response types on a binary decision-making task. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Two important pieces of information are garnered from this table – the hit rate (HR) and the 
false positive rate (FPR).  The HR is calculated as the proportion of hits when a signal is 
present, and the FPR is calculated as the proportion of false positives on noise alone trials.  
Using these values we can calculate discriminability: 
d' = Z(HR) – Z(FPR) 
where Z(HR) and Z(FPR) are transformations of the hit and false positive rates to inverse Z-
scores, 
and response bias: 
lnβ = -0.5 * d' * [Z(HR) + Z(FPR)] 
as used in Tsoi et al. (2008), Mashal and Faust (2008), and Macmillan and Creelman (1990).  
When there is no sensitivity (i.e. the participant cannot discriminate signal from noise), d' = 0.  
When a response is unbiased, lnβ = 1.  A lnβ-value > 1, indicates that a participant has a 
conservative response bias and tends to prefer to say, ―No, a signal is not present.‖  
Conversely, a lnβ < 1 indicates the participant has a liberal response bias and tends to say, 
―Yes, a signal is present.‖ 
 
Image Analysis 
All images were converted from dicom to NIfTI image format using nordicICE (version 2.2.9; 
NordicImagingLab AS; Bergen, Norway).  Image analysis was conducted using Statistical 
Parametric Mapping (SPM5, http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/spm5/; Wellcome Trust Centre 
   
Signal 
   
Present Absent 
Response 
"present" Hit False Positive 
"absent" Miss 
Correct 
Negative 
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for Neuroimaging, London, UK).  All volumes were realigned to the first volume (Friston et 
al., 1995a) and the anatomical image was co-registered to the mean functional image to 
ensure that they were aligned.  Each subject’s structural image was spatially normalised to the 
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) T1-weighted template image supplied with SPM5 
(Friston et al., 1995b).  The functional images were then spatially normalised using the 
parameters obtained in the structural normalization, resampled to a voxel size of 3x3x3mm, 
and smoothed using an 8mm full-width at half-maximum Gaussian kernel.  A high-pass-filter 
using a cut-off value of 128s was applied to compensate for signal drift, and the default SPM5 
low pass filter was applied to reduce the effects of physiological noise. 
A boxcar model convolved with a synthetic hemodynamic response function was used 
(Friston et al., 1995a).  Three contrasts were tested for significance using a two-stage, 
random-effects, ROI analysis.  The REW and NC-REW blocks were contrasted; the PUN and 
NC-PUN blocks were contrasted; and the REW and PUN blocks were contrasted.  In the first 
stage of this analysis, contrast images for each subject, for each contrast of interest were 
created.  The single-subject contrast images were then included in a second-level, random-
effects analysis.  This analysis was performed for each of the three contrasts of interest.  To 
test the a priori hypotheses we had about signal changes in the bilateral ventral striatum, 
anterior cingulate cortex, insula and orbitofrontal cortex, small volume corrections based on 
anatomically predefined ROIs using the SPM WFU PickAtlas toolbox (version 2.3, 
http://fmri.wfubmc.edu/cms/software#PickAtlas; Wake Forest University School of 
Medicine; Maldjian et al., 2003 & Maldjian et al., 2004) were applied. 
 
Correlation Analyses 
A voxelwise correlation between change in response bias (Δlnβ) and contrast images [PUN-
(NC-Pun)] was performed.  
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RESULTS 
BEHAVIOURAL RESULTS 
Paired-sample t-tests indicated that there was not a significant difference in response time for 
any of the four response outcomes (hit, miss, correct negative, and false positive) or the 
ability to detect signal from noise (d-prime) between the reward and no-reward contingency 
(REW vs. NC-REW) (Table 3a); the punishment and the no punishment contingency (PUN 
vs. NC-PUN) (Table 3b), or between the reward and punishment contingency (REW vs. 
PUN) (Table 3c).  In the PUN vs. NC-PUN comparison, there was a significant difference in 
response bias, t = -4.11, p < 0.001.  This indicated that participants adopted a more liberal 
response strategy, i.e. they were more likely to say a target was present when their incorrect 
responses were punished than when no monetary contingency was associated with their 
responses (Table 3b). 
 
Table 3a.  Reward vs. No Reward 
  REW NC-REW t p 
Response Time (ms) 718 ± 144 722 ± 145 -0.37 n.s. 
d-prime (d´) 1.89 ± 0.68 1.78 ± 0.74 1.14 n.s. 
Response Bias (lnβ) 0.22 ± 0.65 0.44 ± 0.85 -1.55 n.s. 
     
     Table 3b.  Punishment vs. No Punishment 
  PUN NC-PUN t p 
Response Time (ms) 731 ± 123 726 ± 126 0.25 n.s. 
d-prime (d´) 1.73 ± 0.68 1.75 ± 0.69 -0.15 n.s. 
Response Bias (lnβ) 0.13 ± 0.64 0.50 ± 0.67 -4.11 0.001* 
     
     Table 3c.  Reward vs. Punishment 
  REW PUN t p 
Response Time (ms) 718 ± 144 731 ± 123 -0.35 n.s. 
d-prime (d´) 1.89 ± 0.68 1.73 ± 0.68 0.94 n.s. 
Response Bias (lnβ) 0.22 ± 0.65 0.13 ± 0.64 0.62 n.s. 
Values are reported as mean ± standard deviation.  Reported p values reflect the 
results of paired sample t-tests. 
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IMAGING RESULTS 
Reward vs. No Reward 
Significant activations were found in the bilateral: ventral striatum, anterior cingulate cortex, 
anterior insula, ventral lateral OFC, and the right dorsal lateral OFC when responding for 
reward (REW) compared to responding without a reward contingency (NC-REW) (Table 4 & 
Figs. 6 & 7).  In addition to the a-priori defined regions of interests, a whole brain analysis (p 
< 0.05, FDR corrected; extent cluster k > 25 voxels) found one significant cluster in the right 
lingual gyrus (MNI coordinates: x, y, z = 39, -81, -18; z = 6.85; p < 0.001).   
 
 
Table 4.       
REW vs. NC-REW: fMRI ROI results 
ROI Laterality x y z Peak z-score p(FDR-corr) 
Ventral striatum right 15 12 -6 4.82 < 0.001 
 left -12 9 -6 4.03 < 0.001 
       
Anterior cingulate 
cortex 
right 15 33 27 4.70 < 0.001 
 left -3 33 27 3.26 < 0.01 
       
Anterior insula right 33 21 -6 5.02 < 0.001 
 left -30 21 -12 4.43 < 0.001 
       
Ventral lateral OFC right 24 48 -18 5.67 < 0.001 
 left -30 18 -12 4.38 < 0.001 
       
Dorsal lateral OFC right 45 42 15 3.78 < 0.005 
Data are thresholded at p < 0.05 (FDR-corrected) and only clusters with > 25 voxels are 
reported.  ROI anatomical region, hemisphere and coordinates are based on the 
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) system. 
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Figure 6.  Differences in BOLD fMRI activations between the REW block and the NC-REW 
block: (a) ventral striatum; (b) anterior cingulate cortex; (c) orbitofrontal cortex; (d) anterior 
insula.  Colours refer to t-values. 
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Figure 7.  Parameter estimates ± S.E.M. indicating greater activation in the REW than in the 
NC-REW block: rVS = right ventral striatum; rACC = right anterior cingulate cortex; rAIC = 
right anterior insula cortex; rVLOFC = right ventrolateral orbitofrontal cortex; rDLOFC = 
right dorsolateral orbitofrontal cortex. 
23 
 
Punishment vs. No Reward 
Significant activations were found bilaterally in the: ventral striatum, anterior insula, ventral 
lateral OFC and in the right anterior cingulate cortex and dorsal lateral OFC when responding 
under the punishment contingency (PUN) compared to responding without a monetary 
punishment contingency (NC-PUN) (Table 5 & Figs. 8 & 9).  A whole brain analysis (p < 
0.05, FDR-corrected; extent cluster k > 25 voxels) was conducted and no areas outside of the 
ROIs survived error correction. 
 
 
Table 5.       
PUN vs. NC-PUN: fMRI ROI results 
ROI Laterality x y z Peak z-score p(FDR-corr) 
Ventral striatum right 15 9 -9 4.03 < 0.01 
 left -12 12 -6 2.88 < 0.05 
       
Anterior cingulate cortex right 12 36 27 3.26 < 0.05 
       
Anterior insula right 30 15 -12 4.21 < 0.005 
 left -30 24 -6 3.83 < 0.005 
       
Ventral lateral OFC right 21 48 -21 3.91 < 0.01 
 left -24 48 -18 3.24 < 0.05 
       
Dorsal lateral OFC right 42 51 18 4.12 < 0.05 
Data are thresholded at p < 0.05 (FDR-corrected) and only clusters with > 25 voxels are 
reported.  ROI anatomical region, hemisphere and coordinates are based on the Montreal 
Neurological Institute (MNI) system. 
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Figure 8.  Differences in BOLD fMRI activation between the PUN and NC-PUN blocks: (a) 
ventral striatum; (b) anterior cingulate cortex; (c) orbitofrontal cortex; (d) anterior insula.  
Colours refer to t-values. 
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Figure 9.  Parameter estimates ± S.E.M indicating greater activation in the PUN than in the 
NC-PUN block: rVS = right ventral striatum; rACC = right anterior cingulate cortex; rAIC = 
right anterior insula cortex; rVLOFC = right ventrolateral orbitofrontal cortex; rDLOFC = 
right dorsolateral orbitofrontal cortex. 
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Reward vs. Punishment 
There were no significant activations in the four predefined ROIs when contrasting the reward 
contingency (REW) with the punishment contingency (PUN).  A whole brain analysis was 
conducted, (p < 0.05, FDR corrected; extent cluster k > 25 voxels) and no areas outside of the 
ROIs survived error correction. 
 
CORRELATIONS 
To examine the significant difference in response strategy between the Punishment (PUN) 
and No Punishment Contingency (NC-PUN) blocks, correlation analyses using response 
strategy (lnβ) and BOLD fMRI activation were modelled in SPM5.  Positive correlations 
between change in response strategy (Δlnβ) and BOLD fMRI activation were found in the 
bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), the right supplementary motor area (SMA), 
the right middle temporal gyrus, and the right ventral lateral OFC (Table 6 & Fig. 10).  A 
negative correlation was found between change in response strategy and the right cerebellum, 
and the right medial ventral OFC (Table 7 & Fig. 11) 
 
Table 6. 
      
Positive correlations between change of strategy and BOLD signal  
ROI Laterality x y z r p(uncorrected) 
DLPFC right 33 15 30 0.71 < 0.001 
 left -51 36 15 0.77 < 0.001 
       
SMA right 12 -6 75 0.7 < 0.001 
       
Middle Temporal Gyrus right 54 -75 21 0.67 < 0.005 
       
Ventral lateral OFC right 27 63 -3 0.64 < 0.005 
Data are thresholded at p < 0.01 (uncorrected) and only clusters with > 25 voxels are reported.  
ROI anatomical region, hemisphere and coordinates are based on the Montreal Neurological 
Institute (MNI) system.  DLPFC = dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; SMA = supplementary 
motor area; OFC = orbitofrontal cortex. 
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Figure 10.  Positive correlations between BOLD fMRI activation and change in response 
strategy (Δlnβ): (a) right Supplementary Motor Area; (b) bilateral DLPFC; (c) right ventral 
lateral OFC.  Colours refer to t-values. 
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Table 7.       
Negative correlations between change of strategy and BOLD signal 
ROI Laterality x y z r p(uncorrected) 
Cerebellum right 21 -84 -45 -0.7 < 0.001 
       
Medial ventral OFC right 6 69 -18 -0.62 < 0.005 
Data are thresholded at p < 0.01 (uncorrected) and only clusters with > 25 voxels are 
reported.  ROI anatomical region, hemisphere and coordinates are based on the 
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) system.  OFC = orbitofrontal cortex. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11.  Negative correlations between BOLD fMRI activation and change in response 
strategy: (a) right cerebellum; (b) right medial ventral OFC.  Colours refer to t-values. 
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DISCUSSION 
 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
This study replicates earlier studies showing that when financial reward or punishment is 
contingent on the outcome of a decision, four regions implicated in financial decision-making, 
the ventral striatum, orbitofrontal cortex, anterior insula and anterior cingulate cortex, are 
activated.  This study also finds that a more liberal response bias is adopted when responding 
to avoid punishment than when responding without financial contingency, and that greater 
strategic flexibility correlates with: success on the task; increased activation in the bilateral 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, right: supplementary motor area, middle temporal gyrus and 
ventral lateral OFC; and with decreased activation in the right cerebellum and ventral medial 
OFC. 
The present study was conducted because previous functional MRI studies suggested that 
people may employ different response strategies depending on whether a financial reward or 
punishment is contingent on their decision.  By using a block design and signal-detection 
measures, we were able to isolate the strategic differences.  However, using this type of 
design limited how our reward-related activations could be interpreted.  Typical functional 
MRI studies investigating financial decision-making use an event-related design.  Since 
event-related designs better elucidate the time course of the decision-making process, the 
emphasis of the current literature has been on distinguishing the different temporal 
components of decision-making.  For example, event-related designs have facilitated imaging 
the differences in activation between anticipating a reward and receiving a reward (Knutson et 
al., 2001a; Knutson et al., 2001b).  With the block design currently employed, these temporal 
differences cannot be distinguished, that is, we are unable to separate activations related to 
reward anticipation and outcome, nor are we able to separate activations between loss trials 
and gain trials.  A block design, however, is more robust and is a better tool for investigating 
strategic differences – the primary goal of this study. 
We know from the neuroeconomic perspective that the brain needs to compute the magnitude 
of the outcome and the risk associated with a particular decision – how big it is, and how 
likely it will be obtained (Rolls, 2000; O’Doherty, et al., 2001; Knutson et al., 2003; Paulus et 
al., 2003b; Elliott et al., 2008; Preuschoff et al., 2008; Craig, 2009).  It also needs to track the 
disparity between the expected value of a decision and the realised value of the decision to 
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calculate prediction-error (McClure et al., 2003; Pessiglione et al., 2006; Seymour et al., 
2007; Hare at al., 2008).  Current functional MRI and animal literature suggests that each of 
these decision-making components: magnitude, risk, value, and error-prediction involve the 
orbitofrontal cortex, anterior insular cortex and the ventral striatum respectively (Rolls, 2000; 
O’Doherty, et al., 2001; Knutson et al., 2003; McClure et al., 2003; Paulus et al., 2003b; 
Pessiglione et al., 2006; Seymour et al., 2007; Elliott et al., 2008; Hare at al., 2008; 
Preuschoff et al., 2008; Craig, 2009).  Since the task used in the present study has all the 
elements needed to measure financial decision-making under risk – a binary choice, uncertain 
outcome, and different amounts of money won and lost – and it activates a neural-network 
reliably activated in other financial decision-making studies, it can be concluded that the 
present approach is a valid measure of financial decision-making.  As such, the findings 
regarding strategic shifts should be applicable to studies using event-related design. 
STRATEGY SHIFT 
Since previous decision-making literature suggested that different magnitudes of financial 
reward and punishment seemed to influence response strategy, we hypothesised that a 
different response strategy would be used from a predominantly rewarded to an unrewarded 
contingency and from a predominantly punished to an unpunished contingency. Contrary to 
this hypothesis, a strategic difference was only found for the punishment contingency.  
According to Prospect Theory people are more sensitive to potential losses than to potential 
gains.  For example, in a 50/50 gamble the amount to be won has to be double the amount to 
be risked before people will accept the gamble (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  There appears 
to be a neural correlate to this disparity in sensitivity.  Functional MRI studies have 
demonstrated that the BOLD response in the ventral striatum, orbitofrontal cortex, anterior 
cingulate and the ventral lateral and medial prefrontal cortex is greater for losses than for 
gains of the same magnitude (Tom et al., 2007).  It is possible then, that a strategic shift was 
not observed for the reward contingency in the present study because the reward magnitude 
used was not large enough. 
The response strategy shift that occurred in the punishment contingency was from a fairly 
liberal response bias (more likely to say ―yes‖ a stimulus was present) on the non-contingent 
task, to an even more liberal response bias on the punishment contingency task.  While the 
present study did not find a strategy shift driven difference in activation, recent imaging 
literature has implicated reward-related regions.  It has been found that response bias becomes 
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more liberal with age and that this shift is possibly due to age-related changes in the frontal 
cortex (Windmann et al., 2002; Huh et al., 2006).  Supporting this theory is the finding that 
patients with dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex lesions use a more liberal response bias than 
healthy controls in a recognition memory test (Swick & Knight, 1999) and the finding that 
amnesic patients with anterior limbic system damage, including the OFC, end-up using a 
more liberal response bias because they cannot suppress false positive responses (Schnider & 
Ptak, 1999).  These findings suggest that the frontal cortex, and possibly the OFC, plays a role 
in determining response strategy.  It is, therefore, possible that some of these same regions 
played a role in the strategic differences observed in the present study, but were not as easily 
observed as in patients whose strategic differences are lesion-related. 
STRATEGIC FLEXIBILITY 
Strategic flexibility is an important component of behaviour.  We make decisions based on 
information we receive from our environment about the risk and magnitude of certain options.  
However, once we have made a choice, and persist in that choice, we learn nothing new about 
the environment.  This is why a rewarded choice is occasionally abandoned in favour of 
exploring other options (Rolls, 2004).  Exploring alternatives allows one to update the 
information one has about their environment.  According to Shannon (1948), the more 
uncertain the outcome, the more information the outcome contains (Shannon, 1948 cf. Dreher 
et al., 2006).  In the present study, greater strategic flexibility was associated with better 
performance during the punishment contingency and was correlated with increased ventral 
lateral orbitofrontal cortex activations and decreased ventral medial OFC activation.  Previous 
studies have found that lateral OFC activation correlates with punishment magnitude while 
medial OFC activation correlates with reward magnitude (O’Doherty et al., 2001).  In keeping 
with the present results, it has also been reported that as activation in the lateral OFC 
increases, activation in the medial OFC decreases (O’Doherty et al., 2001).  Since there is a 
greater neural sensitivity to losses than gains, and individuals who exhibit relatively greater 
activation in the OFC are more loss averse (Tom et al., 2007), it is possible that a heightened 
sensitivity to loss aversion is driving strategic flexibility.  Greater flexibility, then, may allow 
for greater avoidance of loss. 
Another region that correlated with strategic flexibility was the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.  
The DLPFC is considered to be a centre of executive function involved in directing attention, 
suppressing irrelevant stimuli, retrieving relevant memories and in planning behaviour 
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(Moghaddam & Homayoun, 2008).  In decision-making paradigms it has been found to be 
active when determining whether or not to act regardless of whether an action is subsequently 
undertaken (Kühn & Brass, 2009; Karch et al., 2009).  For example, in a go/no-go paradigm, 
the DLPFC was active when determining whether or not to respond to a stimulus (Karch et 
al., 2009).  It is possible then, that heightened loss sensitivity results in increased DLPFC 
activation, which in turn acts to exert more efficient control over attention, memory, stimulus 
suppression and behavioural planning, allowing for better avoidance of punishment.  
However, there is an alternative explanation.  One of the tenets of Prospect Theory is that we 
overweight small probabilities and underweight large probabilities (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979).  It has been found that increased activation in the DLPFC is correlated with 
overweighting a probability, while decreased activation in the same area is correlated with 
underweighting large probabilities (Tobler et al., 2008).  The increased DLPFC activation 
correlated with strategic flexibility may be related to greater overweighting of the loss.  
Overweighting the loss may in turn be what is driving the underlying greater sensitivity to 
loss aversion. 
Supplementary motor area (SMA) activation was also found to positively correlate with 
strategic flexibility and performance when responding under a punishment contingency.  The 
SMA has been implicated in determining whether or not to act (Karch et al., 2009), and its 
activation is possibly related to the role it plays in the preparation of voluntary motor action 
(Forstman et al., 2008).  The positive correlation between SMA activation, strategic flexibility 
and task success may be related to better control over the motor system and better response 
execution, that is, pressing the intended button.  It is also possible that, as a region implicated 
in determining future action, its greater activation reflects better transition from deciding to 
act to the action itself. 
Posterior cerebellum activity decreased as strategic flexibility increased.  The cerebellum has 
long been implicated in coordination and motor control.  More recently, neuroimaging studies 
have found that it shows activation in a diverse set of cognitive and perceptual tasks (Cabeza 
& Nyberg, 2000). In a functional MRI study where participants had to choose between a 
small, immediate reward and a large, delayed reward, BOLD activation in the posterior 
cerebellum positively correlated with selection of the immediate reward (Boettiger et al., 
2007; Boettiger et al., 2009).  Interestingly, it was also found that lateral OFC activation 
correlated with selection of the large, delayed reward.  In the present study, decreased 
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cerebellar activation and increased lateral OFC activation was correlated with strategic 
flexibility and success.  The decrease in posterior cerebellar activation and the increase in 
lateral OFC activation, similar to Boettiger et al. (2007), suggest that greater strategic 
flexibility is related to a bias towards choosing larger, delayed rewards.  It is possible that 
either greater strategic flexibility leads to this pattern of activation, or this pattern of activation 
results in adoption of a more flexible strategy. 
The ventral posterior cerebellum is also highly connected to the DLPFC and has been 
implicated in automation of action (Ramnani, 2006).  The present study found that strategic 
flexibility correlated with increased DLPFC activation and with decreased ventral posterior 
cerebellum activation.  It is possible that decreased cerebellum activity reflects a 
disengagement from automatically implementing the current strategy’s response rules.  
Activation of the DLPFC, an area long implicated in executive function, could then reflect the 
formulation and implementation of a new response strategy. 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Through neuroeconomic studies, different components of the decision-making process are 
being identified and localised in the human brain.  While it has become clear from these 
studies that there is a particular neural network consistently and predictably activated by the 
decision-making process, it has also become clear that there are activation differences within 
this network depending both on the personality of the individual and the decision-making 
strategy the individual adopts.  For example, it has been demonstrated that individuals who 
are loss averse in financial decision-making tasks have a sensitised BOLD fMRI response, 
and in the present study it was demonstrated that the ability to employ strategic flexibility on 
a task was correlated with a differential BOLD response in several decision-making centres. 
The study of neuroeconomics isn’t just important for understanding the where and the how of 
decision-making; it also plays an important role in helping us understand both the deficits and 
the causes of particular psychopathologies.  Decision-making deficits have been found in 
addiction (Reuter et al., 2005), major depressive disorder (Kaplan et al., 2006), panic disorder 
(Ludewig, et al., 2003), bipolar disorder (Minassian et al., 2004), and schizophrenia (Paulus et 
al., 2003; Moritz et al., 2005; Kim et al., 2007; Moritz et al., 2007; Polli et al., 2008) and seem 
to be related to differential brain activation patterns.  The greater risk-seeking behaviour 
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shown by pathological gamblers in decision-making tasks correlates with decreased activation 
in the ventral striatum – a major reward and decision-making centre (Reuter et al., 2005).  
Patients with alcoholism show decreased ventral striatal activation to anticipation of monetary 
reward, but increased ventral striatal activation in response to alcohol associated cues (Wrase 
et al., 2007).  Decision-making deficits in bipolar disorder seem to be related to prediction-
error deficits.  It was found that bipolar disorder patients in a manic state showed significantly 
less ventral striatal activation than healthy controls to omission of an expected reward (Abler 
et al., 2008).  In a social decision-making game, patients with schizophrenia had altered 
patterns of activation in the orbitofrontal cortex and anterior insula cortex compared to 
controls (Baas et al., 2008).  Similarly, patients with schizophrenia had significantly weaker 
ventral striatal activation than controls when the likelihood of having to inhibit a response 
increased (Vink et al., 2006).  Decreased error-related activation in the anterior cingulate has 
also been found to characterise decision-making in patients with schizophrenia and has been 
suggested to play a role in their adoption of a more liberal response bias as well as 
contributing to their strategic inflexibility (Polli, et al., 2008).  
While BOLD fMRI allows one to infer regions of activation based on changes in blood 
oxygenation, it does not allow for speculation on the underlying neurochemical basis of the 
observed changes; however, Positron Emission Tomography (PET) does.  PET studies of 
addiction have shown that decreased dopamine functioning is associated with reduced activity 
in the ventral striatum, orbitofrontal cortex, and cingulate cortex – the same regions 
implicated in decision-making (Volkow et al., 2008).  Similarly, increased DA transmission is 
associated with positive symptoms in schizophrenia (Kapur et al., 2005) – a disorder where 
patients have prominent decision-making deficits (Paulus et al., 2003a; Kim et al., 2007; Baas 
et al., 2008; Polli et al., 2008).  From studies like these, it appears as if dopamine, decision-
making and psychopathology are intertwined and that dopamine may play a role in individual 
differences in decision-making, and the decision-making deficits characteristic of certain 
psychopathologies. 
Primate electrophysiological studies suggest that midbrain dopamine neurons release 
dopamine phasically and tonically (Schultz 1997; Schultz et al., 2008).  It has been 
hypothesised that while phasic dopamine release codes the prediction-error component of 
decision-making (Schultz et al., 2008), tonic dopamine release codes for the uncertainty 
component (Fiorillo et al., 2003).  It was found that tonic dopamine release followed an 
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inverted ―U‖ function where midbrain dopaminergic response was strongest when uncertainty 
was greatest (p = 0.5), and was weakest when the outcome was certain (p = 1, or p = 0).  This 
finding is mirrored in a human functional MRI study where activation in the prefrontal cortex 
(a ventral striatal projection site) followed the same inverted ―U‖ function (Dreher et al., 
2006).  These findings suggest that dopamine could be responsible for the changes in BOLD 
fMRI activations when imaging the role of uncertainty in reward.  Similarly, in humans, 
dopamine transmission has been related to the error-prediction component of decision-making 
(Pessiglione et al., 2006; Menon et al., 2007).  These studies expose a possible link between 
dopamine and different components of the decision-making process.  It is possible the 
observed individual differences in decision-making and BOLD fMRI activation, for example 
the finding that greater loss aversion is associated with relatively greater BOLD response in 
the decision-making network, could be a result of differences in dopamine transmission.  This 
seems even more plausible when one considers that there are decision-making deficits in 
schizophrenia, a disorder where hyper-dopaminergic transmission in the midbrain and hypo-
dopaminergic transmission in the frontal cortex is thought to respectively play a role in the 
positive and negative symptoms of the disorder (Davis et al., 1991).  In drug addiction, with 
its own set of decision-making deficits, both fMRI and PET studies have shown that there are 
differential patterns of BOLD activation and of dopamine transmission in the ventral striatum, 
orbitofrontal cortex, anterior cingulate and anterior insula – the decision making network 
(Kilts et al., 2004; Risinger et al., 2005). 
The differences in dopamine transmission that possibly underlie individual differences in 
decision-making may be the result of genetic variation amongst individuals (Yacubian et al., 
2007; Schmack et al., 2008).  Two of the genes that affect dopamine transmission are DAT 
which affects the dopamine re-uptake transporter, and COMT which affects the speed with 
which synaptic dopamine is degradated.  Different allelic variations of COMT result in faster 
or slower degradation of synaptic dopamine.  The most common genotype is homozygous for 
methionine (MET
158
MET); however, valine (VAL) can be substituted for methionine 
resulting in either a genotype homogenous for valine (VAL
158
VAL) or a heterozygous 
genotype.  The different allelic variations affect the impact of synaptic dopamine.  The 
homozygous valine genotype is four times more efficient at catabolising dopamine compared 
to the homozygous methionine genotype (Weinshilboum et al., 1999; cf. Yacubian et al., 
2007).  Similarly, individuals with a 9R DAT variant have fewer dopamine transporters in the 
35 
 
midbrain and more striatal dopamine than individuals with the 10R variant (Floresco et al., 
2003; cf. Yacubian et al., 2007).  While the link between genetics, dopamine and behaviour is 
not very well understood, it has been suggested that high PFC DA concentrations, as a result 
of low COMT activity, stimulates a descending glutamatergic projection which results in 
higher levels of tonic DA release in the ventral striatum (Yacubian et al., 2007).  However, it 
has also been suggested that PFC dopamine activates intermediary GABAergic neurons that 
inhibit DA release from parts of the brain stem (i.e. VTA and substantia nigra) (Akil et al., 
2003).  In a BOLD fMRI study, differences in the COMT genotype resulted in differential 
activation in the ventral striatum and prefrontal cortex, while differences in the DAT genotype 
effected ventral striatal activation during anticipation of a monetary reward (Yacubian et al., 
2007).  This study demonstrated how genetic differences can influence dopamine 
transmission in regions of the brain implicated in the decision-making process. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Prospect theory stipulates that, in general, people weight losses more heavily than gains.  
However, it appears as if some people weight losses more heavily than others.  From the 
results of the present study, I argue that it is greater relative sensitivity to financial loss that 
drives strategic flexibility – the more sensitive one is to loss, the more likely they are to adopt 
a flexible strategy to facilitate avoiding loss.  Evidence from current literature suggests that 
individual differences in sensitivity may be driven by differences in dopamine transmission.  
In turn, differences in dopamine transmission appear to be driven by genetic variation.  The 
use of a block design in the present study makes it ideal for use in a PET paradigm where the 
link between dopamine transmission, genetics and decision-making can be investigated.  
Further, since abnormalities in both decision-making and dopamine are characteristic of many 
different psychopathologies, the present paradigm could be used in both PET and fMRI 
imaging to investigate the relationship between decision-making deficits and strategic 
flexibility. 
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